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1. Introduction
The notion of a multisignature scheme was introduced nearly 20 years
ago [Itakura and Nakamura, 1983], and a number of schemes have been
proposed since that time. The fundamental idea of a multisignature
scheme is that it enables a number of users to collectively create a digital
signature on a document (using their own private keys). Typically, all
users will sign the same document, and either the order in which they
sign will be fixed or, if it is not fixed, then the verifier will not be able
to determine in which order the various users signed the document.
For further details on such multisignature techniques, and also on the
ElGamal signature scheme on which the cryptosystems described in this
paper are based, see, for example, [Menezes et al., 1997].
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21.1. Mitomi-Miyaji multisignatures
Recent papers [Mitomi and Miyaji, 2000, Mitomi and Miyaji, 2001]
extend the notion of a multisignature. They provide a model for a
multisignature scheme that allows three key properties:
message flexibility, i.e., each party can sign a different document,
order flexibility, i.e., the order in which the various parties create
their contribution to the multisignature is not fixed, and
order verifiability, i.e., the order in which the various parties cre-
ated their contribution to the multisignature can be verified by the
verifier of the multisignature.
Mitomi and Miyaji also propose two different multisignature schemes fit-
ting this model, one discrete logarithm based and the other RSA based.
1.2. Multisignatures for mobile agents
In [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001], the application of Mitomi-Miyaji mul-
tisignatures to a mobile agent environment is considered. Specifically,
mobile agents (essentially autonomous pieces of code) may visit a num-
ber of host platforms, and may wish to collectively sign a message, e.g. to
commit to a transaction on behalf of the original sponsor of the agents.
Each agent will be equipped with its own (multi)signature private key.
The reason to employ such a model is that single agents may not be
trusted to complete a transaction on behalf of a remote sponsor, since
their operation may be interfered with by the platform on which they
run. In general, there are a number of ways in which the threat posed
by a small number of malicious platforms can be reduced. One such
approach is to send multiple copies of a transaction agent to a number
of platforms, and require that a certain number of copies of the agent
(running on different platforms) all consent before the transaction is
completed. Each copy of the agent is equipped with a distinct signature
key pair (thus preventing an agent on one platform masquerading as an
agent executing on a different platform). Of course such an approach
requires some co-ordination amongst the various platforms involved, but
this is not an issue we consider further here.
A variant of the above approach motivates the particular application
of multisignatures we consider here. The model discussed in [Kotzaniko-
laou et al., 2001] involves a series of agents: U1, U2, . . . , Un each con-
tributing to a multisignature in turn. Each agent Ui adds its own mes-
sage string mi to the evolving multisignature, and thus user Ui actually
contributes to a multisignature on a sequence of messagesm1,m2, . . . ,mi.
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We suppose that the recipient of the multisignature will only accept it if
a minimum number of distinct agents have contributed to the signature,
and that all the agent messages mi are ‘consistent’ in some application-
specific way.
In this context, [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001] identify a potential prob-
lem with use of Mitomi-Miyaji multisignatures. Specifically, a mali-
cious user can delete one or more of the most recent agent contributions
from a multisignature (Kotzanikolaou et al. call this an exclude attack).
Kotzanikolaou et al. propose two different ways of addressing this prob-
lem.
The first approach, described in Section 3.4 of [Kotzanikolaou
et al., 2001], is called a ‘simple solution’. It requires signing agent
Uj to include in message mj the identity of Uj+1, the agent which
Uj selects to be the next entity to contribute to the multisigna-
ture. This clearly prevents a malicious party from ‘winding back’
a multisignature. No changes to the Mitomi-Miyaji schemes are
required.
The second method, described in Section 3.5 of [Kotzanikolaou
et al., 2001], is called ‘structural proven signer ordering’. This so-
lution actually involves a minor modification to the discrete loga-
rithm based Mitomi-Miyaji scheme. The multisignature computa-
tion performed by Uj is modified to include the value of the public
key of the next party to the multisignature, namely Uj+1. This is
designed to achieve the same objective as the simple solution.
Unfortunately, as we describe below, it is precisely this small modi-
fication that enables the manipulation of multisignatures in certain
special circumstances. The main conclusion of this paper is there-
fore that the ‘simple solution’ is probably preferable.
Specifically, in the remainder of this paper we describe two undesir-
able features of the structural proven signer modification to the Mitomi-
Miyaji discrete logarithm based multisignature scheme.
1.3. Notation and assumptions
We use the notation of [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001]. Specifically, we
suppose that a multisignature is being computed by a series of signers
U1, U2, . . . , Uj . The part multisignature output by user Uj consists of
two sequences of values, namely the messages m1,m2, . . . ,mj (where
mi is chosen by Ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ j), and the multisignature components
s1, s2, . . . , sj (where si is computed by Ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ j), together with the
single value rj .
4As in the scheme described in Section 3.5 of [Kotzanikolaou et al.,
2001], we suppose that p and g are universally agreed domain parame-
ters, where p is a large prime satisfying p = 2q + 1, q is also prime, and
g (1 < g < p) has multiplicative order q modulo p.
2. A (partial) message manipulation attack
Suppose a malicious user has succeeded in obtaining iq as its public
key, for some integer i. Of course, in general, the malicious user will not
know the private key for this public key, i.e. the malicious user will not
know a value x for which gx mod p = iq. However, this does not prevent
at least a partial attack, as we now describe.
2.1. The partial attack
Suppose that a multisignature is being constructed (using the method
in Section 3.5 of [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001]) by a series of signers
U1, U2, . . . , Uj , and that the next signer (Uj+1) is the malicious user;
hence Uj+1 has yj+1 = iq as its public key. For convenience we also
suppose that j > 1, although the attack will work in almost exactly the
same way if j = 1.
Using the notation of [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001], Uj will compute
Rj = gkj mod p,
rj = (h(mj ||IDj) · rj−1)−1 ·Rj mod q, and
sj = (xjrj + yj+1) · k−1j mod q
where xj is the private key of Uj , h is a hash-function, and yj+1 is the
public key of user Uj+1. Hence, since we know that yj+1 mod q = 0, we
have
sj = xjrjk−1j mod q.
User Uj then sends rj , sj and mj to Uj+1 (together with various other
values not of relevance here).
User Uj+1 can now change the message mj which user Uj signed.
Specifically, suppose user Uj+1 wishes to make it look as though user Uj
signed message m′j 6= mj . User Uj+1 first computes h(m′j ||IDj) and then
computes
r′j = rj · h(mj ||IDj) · (h(m′j ||IDj))−1 mod q.
This requires no special knowledge. However, the fact that yj+1 mod q =
0 enables Uj+1 to compute the ‘matching’ value s′j using
s′j = sjr
−1
j r
′
j mod q = xjr
′
jk
−1
j mod q = (xjr
′
j + yj+1) · k−1j mod q.
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These new values r′j and s′j can now be used to replace rj and sj in the
(partial) multisignature, at the same time that m′j replaces mj .
2.2. Completing the attack
Whether or not the process described above is a serious attack de-
pends on whether or not Uj+1 is in a position to complete the modified
multisignature. This depends on whether Uj+1 possesses the private key
xj+1 corresponding to the public key yj+1 = iq. In general this appears
to be difficult to arrange.
However, there is one specific case where it is possible for a malicious
user to calculate the private key corresponding to a public key congruent
to zero modulo q. Suppose, as is often described, the domain parameters
p and g are selected as follows.
1 p is chosen so that q = (p− 1)/2 is prime, and thus precisely q− 1
of the p− 1 non-zero elements modulo p, i.e. approximately 50%,
will be primitive (see, for example, Section 4.6.1 of [Menezes et al.,
1997]).
2 A primitive element modulo p is chosen; call this value e.
3 g is set equal to e2, guaranteeing that g has order q.
Suppose moreover that e = 2. This is not unlikely to be the case;
heuristically we expect 2 to be primitive roughly half the time, since
roughly half the non-zero elements are primitive, and 2 is typically the
first value chosen in a search for a primitive element. In such a case we
have g = 22 mod p = 4.
Next observe that 2q mod p = p − 1 = 2q, and hence 2q−1 mod p =
q. Thus, g(q−1)/2 mod p = 2q−1 mod p = q. That is, the private key
corresponding to the public key q is simply (q − 1)/2. Hence, in this
special case, if the malicious user chooses his/her public key to be q,
then he/she will know his/her own private key, and hence would be able
to complete the forged partial multisignature. This represents a serious
compromise of the security of the scheme.
Of course, if this particular special case is avoided then the partial sig-
nature cannot be completed and the ‘partial attack’ is simply a (probably
unexploitable) questionable property of the scheme.
Finally note that there is one other way in which the above situation
can arise. Suppose that, after selecting p (and hence q), g is found by
successively examining values 2, 3, 4, and so on, until an element of order
q is found. This is a reasonable approach, since small values of g have
implementation advantages. Suppose also that 2 and 3 are primitive
6(and hence are not suitable) — as previously, using heuristic arguments
we expect this to be true roughly 25% of the time. Then 4 will have
order q and will be selected — exactly the same situation now arises.
3. A destination manipulation attack
We show how three different users can conspire to manipulate a con-
tribution to a multisignature made by an honest user.
Suppose that a multisignature is being constructed (using the method
in Section 3.5 of [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001]) by a series of signers
U1, U2, . . . , Uj , where j > 2.
Then, using the notation of [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001], Uj−1 will
compute
Rj−1 = gkj−1 mod p,
rj−1 = (h(mj−1||IDj−1) · rj−2)−1 ·Rj−1 mod q, and
sj−1 = (xj−1rj−1 + yj) · k−1j−1 mod q
where xj−1 is the private key of Uj−1, h is a hash-function, and yj is the
public key of user Uj . User Uj−1 then sends rj−1, sj−1 and mj−1 to Uj
(together with various other values not of relevance here).
Similarly, Uj will compute
Rj = gkj mod p,
rj = (h(mj ||IDj) · rj−1)−1 ·Rj mod q, and
sj = (xjrj + yj+1) · k−1j mod q
where xj is the private key of Uj and yj+1 is the public key of user Uj+1.
User Uj then sends rj , sj and mj to Uj+1 (together with various other
values not of relevance here).
We now show how a collaboration of three users, namely Uj−1, Uj+1
and a third user which we denote by U ′j+1, can modify the multisignature
contribution of user Uj to make it look as though the next user specified
by Uj was U ′j+1 and not Uj+1. The modifications required are as follows.
First, when computing the original values of Rj−1, rj−1 and sj−1, user
Uj−1 must choose kj−1 equal to x′j+1, where x′j+1 is the private key of
user U ′j+1 (we also denote the private key of user Uj+1 by xj+1). Hence
Rj−1 = gkj−1 mod p = gx
′
j+1 mod p = y′j+1.
Second, the values Rj−1, rj−1 and sj−1 are replaced with new values
R′j−1, r′j−1 and s′j−1 computed using a new ‘random value’ k′j−1, where
k′j−1 = xj+1, the private key of user Uj+1.
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The replacement values are now computed as follows:
R′j−1 = g
k′j−1 mod p = gxj+1 mod p = yj+1,
r′j−1 = rj−1 · (y′j+1 mod q)−1 · (yj+1 mod q) mod q
= rj−1 · (Rj−1 mod q)−1 · (R′j−1 mod q) mod q
= (h(mj−1||IDj−1) · rj−2)−1 ·R′j−1 mod q,
s′j−1 = (xj−1r
′
j−1 + yj) · (k′j−1)−1 mod q
= (xj−1r′j−1 + yj) · (xj+1)−1 mod q.
(Note that computing these replacement values is simple since Uj−1 is a
member of the conspiracy).
Replacement values are also computed for Rj , rj and sj as follows,
this time without the co-operation of user Uj :
R′j = Rj , (kj is thus as before),
r′j = rj · (r′j−1)−1 · rj−1 mod q
= (h(mj ||IDj) · r′j−1)−1 ·R′j mod q,
s′j = sj · r′j · (rj)−1 mod q.
It remains to show that s′j has the required properties. Observe that
s′j = sj · r′j · (rj)−1 mod q,
= (xjrj + yj+1) · k−1j · r′j · (rj)−1 mod q, (by definition of sj),
= (xjr′j + yj+1 · r′j · (rj)−1) · k−1j mod q,
= (xjr′j + yj+1 · rj−1 · (r′j−1)−1) · k−1j mod q, (by definition of r′j),
= (xjr′j + y
′
j+1) · k−1j mod q (by definition of r′j−1).
This completes the demonstration, since it is clear that s′j identifies U ′j+1
as the next participant in the multisignature instead of Uj+1.
4. Analysis
Observe that, in most circumstances, the (partial) forgery described
in Section 2 cannot be completed to a full multisignature. Hence its
impact is very limited. Moreover, if users are required to prove posses-
sion of their private key before their public key is certified (or otherwise
distributed), as is now deemed ‘good practice’, then in most cases the
partial attack is prevented. However, the existence of such a partial at-
tack (which can be extended to a full attack in certain special cases) is
nevertheless of concern.
8In addition, whilst the forgery described in Section 3 works, and con-
travenes the required properties of the scheme, it does so in a relatively
weak way (given the need for three parties to collaborate to make a small
change to the victim’s signature). That is, it is hard to see how this at-
tack could be exploited to damage real users of the scheme. However,
the existence of such an attack does raise serious questions about the
usability of the scheme.
It would therefore appear wise to use the ‘simple solution for proven
signer ordering’ solution, as proposed in Section 3.4 of [Kotzanikolaou
et al., 2001], as opposed to the ‘structural proven signer ordering’ scheme
given in Section 3.5 of [Kotzanikolaou et al., 2001]. The use of this former
solution has the advantage that it does not change the Mitomi-Miyaji
scheme, which has a proof of security, and it is also applicable to any
appropriate multisignature scheme.
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